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ABSTRACT 
 
There is a growing literature explaining FDI flows in terms of ‘technology sourcing’, 
whereby multinational firms invest in certain locations not to exploit their firm-
specific assets in the host environment, but to access technology that is generated by 
host country firms. However, it is far from clear that the international business 
literature has found significant evidence of such activity beyond a few isolated 
examples. This paper extends this work by allowing for the possibility of MNEs 
sourcing technology not only from host country firms, but also from each other. The 
paper demonstrates that MNEs in the UK do indeed appropriate spillovers both from 
indigenous firms and from other foreign investors, but that there are also significant 
competition effects that act to reduce productivity in certain industries. The paper also 
explores which countries’ affiliates gain most from technology sourcing in the UK, 
and which generate the greatest spillovers within the foreign-owned sector.  
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 1.   Introduction 
 
It is often assumed that foreign direct investment (FDI) brings benefits to host 
economies through productivity spillovers from multinational enterprises (MNEs).  
Blomström and Kokko (1998) provide several reasons why such productivity effects 
may take place. Spillovers may occur directly through backwards and forwards 
linkages with indigenous firms, through the licensing of a particular technology, 
through supplier networks or subcontracting arrangements, or indirectly as knowledge 
becomes public and spillovers are assimilated by the domestic sector. Secondly, 
labour mobility may generate technology or knowledge spillovers, as employees 
moving from the foreign-owned to the domestic sector transfer firm-specific 
knowledge. 
There is also the possibility of indirect productivity effects on local firms arising from 
foreign affiliates increasing the host country’s knowledge of and access to specialised 
intermediate inputs (Rodriguez-Clare, 1996). Barrell and Pain (1997) estimate that 
around 30% of the productivity growth in UK manufacturing between 1985 and 1995 
could be associated to the impact of inward investment. 
There is now a substantial body of evidence that positive productivity spillovers do 
indeed occuri.  However, this process is neither guaranteed nor automatic, and is also 
potentially problematic to isolate.  First, there is the possibility of a market stealing 
effect, in which more productive MNEs take market share from less efficient 
domestic producers, forcing them up the average cost curve and so lowering their 
productivity (Aitken and Harrison 1999). Secondly, there is the possibility that 
outward FDI may be undertaken not to exploit the technology of an MNE in a new 
location, but to source the technology of a host country and use it to advantage either 
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in the foreign affiliate or in the MNE’s home economy.  Under such circumstances, 
any productivity spillovers may be very limited, or may run in the reverse way from 
the conventional model i.e. from domestic to foreign enterprises. This phenomenon 
has become known in the literature as technology sourcing. Technology sourcing 
behaviour may be particularly important in the flows of FDI between technologically 
advanced countries; indeed Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie and Lichtenberg (2001) 
suggest that much of the outward FDI among the major industrialised countries is of 
this sort.ii 
However, the principle of technology sourcing applies not merely to MNEs benefiting 
from the presence of indigenous firms, but to MNEs benefiting from each other within 
a host economy.  For example, where there is a significant foreign presence in a given 
country it is  reasonable to expect spillovers to develop between the foreign affiliates 
as well as between foreign and domestic establishments.  This is especially likely 
where a particular industrial sector is composed principally of multinational affiliates 
which have chosen – or been encouraged – to enter the host economy specifically 
because of their superior technology.  Under such conditions, local firms may lack the 
absorptive capacity to benefit from productivity spillovers, and externality effects 
may be restricted to the foreign sector only.  
Despite the wealth of research seeking to determine the extent of productivity 
spillovers from MNEs to the domestic sector in various countries, much less attention 
has been paid to the possibility of the reverse effect (technology sourcing FDI), or to 
the phenomenon of productivity spillovers between MNEs within a given host 
economy.  In this paper we examine these phenomena from a UK perspective. In 
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terms of the scale and scope of inward investment, the UK is unique, attracting FDI 
from more countries and across more industries than any other host economy.  
Specifically, we investigate the extent to which the foreign-owned sector is able to 
capture productivity spillovers both from indigenous UK owned enterprises and also 
from other foreign-owned affiliates.  Our results indicate that the foreign sector in UK 
manufacturing derives substantial productivity spillovers from UK-owned firms, but 
that this effect is restricted to relatively R&D-intensive industries.  By contrast, 
productivity spillovers within the foreign-owned sector are more than offset in 
aggregate by strong market-stealing effects.  This is again largely restricted to 
knowledge-intensive industries. There are, however, substantial differences across 
nationality of affiliates in terms of their productivity spillover and competitive effects 
on other foreign affiliates.  
 
2.  FDI, competition and productivity spillovers: a conceptual overview 
From the perspective of the firm, the decision to engage in FDI is traditionally seen as 
deriving from the desire to exploit internationally some competitive or ‘ownership’ 
advantage.  Knowledge-based, firm-specific assets may be hazardous to exploit by 
contractual means such as licensing, because of the property rights and transaction 
cost problems inherent in the highly imperfect market for knowledge and technology, 
thus giving an incentive to engage in FDI (Horstmann and Markusen 1996). This form 
of investment can be described as technology exploiting FDI, and is the form of FDI 
generally associated with positive productivity spillovers from the foreign sector to 
the domestic sector. 
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However, there may be other important motives for FDI.  Fosfuri and Motta (1999) 
and Siotis (1999) present models of the FDI decision which embody the possibility of 
technology sourcing.  They are able to show that a technological laggard may choose 
to enter a foreign market by FDI even where this involves (fixed) set-up costs and 
where the transport costs of exports are zero.  This is because there are positive 
spillover effects associated with locational proximity to a technological leader in the 
foreign country. Assimilation of the acquired technology then decreases the 
production costs of the investing firm both in its foreign subsidiary operations and in 
its home production base.  Where the beneficial technology spillover effect is 
sufficiently strong, Fosfuri and Motta show that it may even pay the laggard firm to 
run its foreign subsidiary at a loss to incorporate the benefits of advanced technology 
in all the markets in which it operates. 
Driffield and Love (2003) present a test of the necessary condition for technology 
sourcing based on the existence of  ‘reverse spillovers’, that is externalities generated 
by domestic firms and appropriated by the foreign sector, and show that such 
spillovers do indeed occur in the UK.  However, there is no theoretical reason why the 
source of such spillovers has to be confined to the domestic sector: the technological 
leader in any given country or sector could be an existing foreign affiliate, generating 
the possibility of MNEs learning from each other in a third country.  This possibility 
is consistent with the empirical evidence on the increasing internationalisation of 
R&D (Cantwell, 1995), and there is now strong evidence that technology sourcing is 
an important determinant of the international location of R&D by multinationals 
(Niosi, 1999; Pearce, 1999; Serapio and Dalton, 1999). This frequently involves the 
establishment by MNEs of ‘listening posts’ around the world in areas of known 
technological expertise (Gassman and Von Zedtwitz , 1999). For these reasons 
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productivity spillovers might be expected to occur within the foreign sector of an 
economy, as well as between the foreign and domestic sectors. Indeed, there is 
evidence from this literature that, because of the international diffusion of R&D 
activity, it is sometimes easier for an MNE to source technology from the overseas 
affiliate of a rival than from the rival’s home-based plants.    
In seeking to identify spillovers, Aitken and Harrison (1999) point to the possibility 
that MNEs entering a host economy may take market share from less efficient 
indigenous firms, forcing them to produce lower levels of output at higher average 
cost than was the case before entry.  Where this effect is pronounced, it may offset 
any positive spillover effects derived from the MNEs, so that foreign entry has a net 
negative effect on domestic productivityiii.   As with technology sourcing, it is 
possible that there may be a market-stealing effect occurring within the foreign-owned 
sector, which may offset any productivity spillovers occurring between foreign 
affiliates in a given host economy. It is not difficult to imagine these conditions in a 
UK context, where MNEs entering the country are more likely to compete with each 
other than with indigenous firms, especially in industries which are dominated by 
multinationals. Obvious examples would include the car industry, the electronics 
industry in Scotland and the white goods sector in South Wales. Indeed, there is 
recent evidence that inward FDI into the UK does increase competition and reduce 
profitability overall (Driffield 2001a), an effect which is unlikely to be solely at the 
expense of the UK sector.  
Conceptually, therefore, a taxonomy of possible net productivity effects of inward 
FDI can be established, depending on the motivation for FDI (technology exploiting 
or technology sourcing) and on the possibility of a market-stealing (i.e. competition) 
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effect.  From the perspective of the domestic sector, anticipated spillover effects from 
FDI will be unambiguously (net) positive only if the motivation for FDI is technology 
exploiting (so that there is some technological advantage which may spill over to the 
domestic sector) and there is no market-stealing effect by incoming MNEs.  Where 
there is such competition, technology-exploiting FDI may have a positive or negative 
effect on domestic productivity, depending on whether the spillover or competition 
effects predominate.  Where the motivation for inward FDI is technology sourcing, 
positive spillovers are unlikely as the incoming multinational is likely to be a 
technological laggard with little to offer the domestic economy.  If there is no market-
stealing competition effect the likely outcome is no spillover effect, with a probable 
negative effect on domestic productivity if technology sourcing FDI is accompanied 
by competition through market stealingiv. 
From the perspective of the foreign sector, anticipated spillover effects from other 
foreign affiliates will follow the pattern outlined above.  However, the picture for the 
foreign sector is further complicated by the possibility of spillovers from the domestic 
sector, as theorised by Fosfuri and Motta (1999) and shown empirically by Driffield 
and Love (2003).  
 
3.  Determining the scale of productivity spillovers. 
The method for identifying technological externalities adopted here follows the 
seminal paper by Griliches (1992), who postulates an augmented production function 
including both internal and external factors of production. The presence of such 
external influences on the firm is the consequence of externalities in production, due 
to formal or informal linkages between firms.  
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lnQit = a + 1ln(Kit) + 2ln(Lit) +  rp iktp X1  + vit     (1) 
Where X is the vector of externalities, which is linked (usually positively) to total 
factor productivity.  It is assumed that there may be individual and time effects i.e.  vit 
= i + t + uit, where uit are the random errors, assumed to be iid (0, 2u ).v 
This framework has been used to test for spillovers from FDI in the conventional 
sense, that is the extent to which capital investment by foreign owned firms is linked 
to total factor productivity in the domestic sector. For recent examples of this 
literature and methodology, see Haskel et al (2001), Harris (2002), Harris and 
Robinson (2002), Driffield (2001b) and the earlier literature summarized in Görg and 
Strobl (2001).  
In addition, a further factor in studies of productivity growth and externalities is the 
importance of learning by doing and the cumulative effects of continuous production. 
Islam (1995) shows that the appropriate specification within an econometric 
framework is to relate current total factor productivity to previous levels of output. By 
definition, this captures the importance of past levels of inputs in the production 
process.  Therefore a dynamic specification is employed in which accumulated 
experience is proxied by a lagged dependent variable, as in (2).  For further discussion 
of the econometric specification of this problem, see Lee et al (1998) and Pesaran and 
Smith (1995). 
Thus, to encompass learning by doing effects, the specification becomes: 
lnQijt = a +  lnQijt-1 + 1ln(Kijt) + 2ln(Lijt) +  rp iktp X1  + vijt  kj (2) 
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with the data stratified by industry (i), country of ownership (j) and time (t). 
The econometric specification of externalities 
As Oulton (1997) and Driffield (2001b) outline, many studies of externalities suffer 
from specification error. For example, Oulton (1996) and Basu and Fernald (1995) 
suggest that if the vector of externalities in a specification such as equation (2) 
contains output variables, then a change in aggregate demand, impacting 
simultaneously on internal and external output, may generate spurious ‘evidence’ of 
externalities or spillovers where none exist. This arises as a result of the error term in 
(2) being related to aggregate output growth.  The problem of spurious externality 
effects can largely be alleviated by a more precise specification of the externality 
term. 
On both theoretical and econometric grounds, the vector of spillovers used here is 
lagged external investment i.e. investment external to the group of firms under 
investigation.  The theoretical justification for this, derived from the theory of the 
firm, is that technological advance (or technology new to a particular location), or the 
international transfer of firm-specific assets, is embodied in new capital investment 
rather than in output, employment, or local R&D expenditurevi.  
Econometrically, the use of lagged external investment results in a tightly defined 
source of potential spillovers, so it is unlikely that the ‘spillover’ variable will be 
related to the error term in (2)vii. One possible test for the appropriateness of our 
specification is to replace the investment term with the comparable value for 
contemporaneous output. If this produces no significant result, then one can be 
confident that any results generated using lagged investment are not the result of 
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spurious correlation. This is discussed at length in Driffield (2001b) and the 
appropriate test is carried out in the econometric analysis belowviii. 
 
4.  Data and Method of Estimation 
The data set employed here was obtained from the UK Office for National Statistics 
(ONS). This provides annual data from 1984 to 1997 on input and output flows 
(including sales and value added), capital investment and employment by industrial 
sector and country of ownership for each of 31 manufacturing industries.ix  In total, 
the database includes 24 countries of ownership including the UK, but in practice the 
analysis is restricted to 22 countries of ownership, plus the UK, accounting for over 
99% of all activity in these industries. This provides some 713 observations per year:  
while not all countries are represented in each sector in each year, the presence of a 
certain source country in a given industry is relatively consistent over the time period.  
 
Table 1 illustrates the breakdown of foreign investment by country of ownership in 
the UK. This conforms to the relatively well understood pattern that over the time 
period some 23% of capital investment in UK manufacturing was carried out by 
foreign owned firms, the largest single investor being the USA (13%) and the rest of 
Europe totalling 5.4%. Japan accounts for just under 2% of total investment.  The 
pattern of overall investment is reflected in the number of industries which have a 
presence: US investment is spread across several industries, while most other 
countries’ investment is concentrated in a few industries, as has been documented 
elsewhere.x  
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The use of industry level data does, of course, require us to consider the possibility of 
spurious results when estimating externality effects: it is conceivable, for example, 
that FDI is simply attracted to industries with the potential for high growth. However, 
it is possible to allow for this by instrumenting the FDI variables with lags and by 
including full sets of industry and time dummies in the models. Görg and Strobl 
(2001) argue that the potential aggregation bias from industry level data is minimal in 
practice, and the alternative of using firm or plant-level data has its own drawbacks. 
Estimating growth equations with firm-level panel data can lead to specification 
problems as well as the invalidity of instruments for capital and employment at the 
firm level, if capital stock data are available at all. This is a problem first explored by 
Griliches and Mairesse (1995). As a result, the firm level analysis of externality 
effects tends to rely on the rather less reliable two-step approach to explaining 
variations in total factor productivity growth.  
As is well understood, the GMM estimator suggested by Blundell and Bond (1998) 
can be used to estimate (2), which generates heteroscedastic-consistent estimates. This 
involves taking first differences in order to generate a transformed difference 
equation, then estimating this simultaneously with the levels equation. All explanatory 
variables are instrumented with all possible lagged values, as discussed in Arellano 
and Bond (1988, 1991). There is a concern that with the estimation of what is 
essentially a ‘growth’ model, the estimate of the coefficient on the lagged dependent 
variable has an upward bias if the panel data exhibits significant heterogeneity 
(Pesaran and Smith, 1995).  There is no definitive test for this, but a reasonable test 
with these data is to allow for slope dummies in the lagged dependent variable, 
allowing  to vary across industries or across country of ownership. Standard 
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specification tests reject the inclusion of such variables, suggesting that heterogeneity 
is not a problem in these data. 
The econometric estimation proceeds in three parts.  We first determine whether there 
is evidence of any investment externalities in UK manufacturing industry.  Having 
confirmed the existence of investment externalities in productivity growth, we then 
distinguish between differential effects of investment by foreign and domestic firms, 
and subsequently investigate the  investment externalities accruing to the foreign 
sector in UK manufacturing.  The second part of the empirical analysis therefore 
investigates whether the foreign sector derives productivity spillovers from 
investment by other firms in the UK, whether these derive mainly from the domestic 
(UK-owned) sector or from other foreign-owned establishments, and the extent to 
which any effect is restricted to R&D-intensive industries.  The third part examines 
the extent to which the foreign-owned sector benefits from spillover effects arising 
from the FDI activities of selected other foreign countries’ affiliates. 
5.  Results of Econometric Analysis 
5.1 Overall investment externalities 
The initial estimation is designed to detect the existence of intra-industry investment 
externalities between establishments of different nationalities.  The dependent 
variable is therefore lnQijt,  the value added of establishments owned by country j in 
sector i in a given year expressed in real terms (1990 prices). The domestic (i.e. UK-
owned) sector is simply one element of the vector j in this case. The ‘internal’ 
independent variables are as follows: K is a measure of capital stock; ML is 
employment of operatives; NL is employment of non-operatives (both expressed as 
 12
FTEs); while X is the external investment elsewhere in the industry (kj) and captures 
the externality term.  As is common with data of this sort, information on capital stock 
is either unavailable or extremely unreliable. The sum of net investment over the 
previous four years is therefore used as a proxy, with a standard depreciation rate of 
10%. The externality term in is based on external capital stock (i.e. investment in the 
industry by firms of all other nationalities), the exact definition and measurement of 
which varies with the sample being used for the estimation. This is calculated for the 
various sub-samples in the same manner as internal capital, i.e. perpetual inventory in 
real terms with depreciation.  
Because of marked changes in industrial classification in 1992, the estimation is 
carried out separately for the periods 1984-92 and 1993-97.  This also explains the 
single measure of employment (L) used in the latter estimation; from 1993 ONS does 
not report data separately for the employment of operatives and non-operatives.  
The results of estimating equation (2) are given in Table 2. The estimations produce a 
well-behaved production function, with clear evidence of investment externalities 
generally in UK manufacturing (positive and significant coefficients on Xit-1 for both 
time periods). There is of course the possibility that certain industries are dominating 
and driving these results. There are numerous ways of extending the analysis to test 
for this. One possibility is to apply weights to the data, in order to prevent small sector 
/ country combinations having an undue effect. The results presented here are not 
sensitive to the application of weightsxi, but this at best is an econometric rather than 
theoretical solution. Our attention therefore turns to the foreign sector, omitting the 
UK owned firms, and to individual country effects in turn. While standard Chow-type 
tests confirm that uniform parameters can be applied to the ‘internal’ variables, both 
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across country of ownership and sector, the individual country externality effects are 
more informative.  
5.2 Investment externalities accruing to the foreign sector 
The analysis is now restricted to the foreign sector, and we investigate whether the 
foreign sector benefits from spillovers arising from investment both by indigenous 
UK firms (the domestic sector) and from other foreign-owned firms operating with 
the UK (the other-foreign sector).  Equation 2 is therefore re-estimated for the foreign 
sector only, with the investment externality measure now split between domestic 
investment (UKIit-1) and other-foreign investment (FDIit-1).  Results are shown in 
Table 3.  For both time periods the results are consistent and striking.  There is strong 
evidence of positive ‘reverse spillovers’ i.e. externalities accruing to the foreign sector 
from investment by the domestic sector.  By contrast, other-foreign investment gives 
rise to negative productivity effects among the foreign sector.   
The former result gives support for ‘technology sourcing’ FDI, in which foreign firms 
enter the UK in order to access the technology of indigenous firms rather than to 
exploit their own superior technology in the UK.  Other empirical evidence supports 
the possibility of this form of FDI.  For example, Cantwell (1999) shows that the 
pattern of US investment in the UK changed during the late 1980s and 1990s, away 
from industries in which US multinationals are technologically strong towards those 
industries in which the UK has significant technological expertise.  Cantwell sees this 
as consistent with a technology sourcing approach, and with the internationalisation of 
the search for technology outlined earlier.  More generally, in a study of FDI flows 
between major industrialised countries over twenty years, van Pottelsberghe de la 
Potterie and Lichtenberg (2001) find that outward FDI makes a positive contribution 
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to domestic total factor productivity. The presumed mechanism for this is that 
spillover effects are generated by accessing the foreign R&D capital stock in target 
countries; by contrast, inward FDI has no such effect. They therefore conclude that 
FDI flows are predominantly technology sourcing in nature, and that inward FDI in 
particular represents a ‘Trojan horse’, motivated principally by the desire to take 
advantage of the technological base of host countries.  
The negative other-foreign externality suggests that there is a substantial market-
stealing effect occurring between foreign manufacturing establishments in the UK.  
Either there are no spillovers between foreign establishments, or any such effect is 
more than offset by a strong competition effect (Aitken and Harrison 1999).  On 
balance, foreign firms entering the UK gain from indigenous investment, but compete 
with other foreign firms.xii 
A prori it is likely that spillover effects will be particularly strong in knowledge-
intensive industries. These are the industries in which technology transfer via FDI is 
most likely to occur and consequently from within which there is the greatest 
technological expertise to be gained through spillovers. We therefore perform the 
estimation of equation (2) separately for R&D intensive and non-R&D intensive 
industries (Table 4). Following the usual convention in the industrial organization 
literature, an R&D intensive industry is defined as one where R&D expenditure 
exceeds 1% of value added in a given year. Data on R&D were provided by the ONS.   
 The results for the R&D intensive industries mirror closely those for the foreign-
owned sector overall.  By contrast, there is no evidence of positive externalities in the 
non-R&D intensive industries, but some indication of a competition effect between 
foreign affiliates in the UK. These findings provide further support for the view that at 
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least some FDI in UK manufacturing is motivated by technology sourcing, and that 
this sourcing is targeted towards research-intensive indigenous UK establishments 
rather than foreign subsidiaries operating in the UK.  However, the principal source of 
competition for foreign affiliates in  both high and low R&D industries appears to be 
other foreign affiliates, not UK establishments. 
 5.3 Individual country effects 
We know from the estimates above that, within the foreign-owned sector overall, 
competition effects offset productivity enhancing effects.  This does not mean that no 
productivity spillovers exist, however, merely that they may be masked by more 
substantial market stealing effects.  It is possible, further, that the nature and strength 
of the competition and productivity effects vary within the foreign sector, so that 
affiliates from different countries generate different spillovers effects within the 
foreign sector of UK manufacturing. The final part of the empirical estimation 
therefore examines whether FDI from specific countries within the UK generates 
spillovers that other foreign affiliates can appropriate. 
This is done by re-estimating equation (2), but allowing the spillover variable to relate 
to a specific country i.e. the variable Xit comprises the lagged investment of affiliates 
from a given country.  The dataset permits this estimation to be performed for nine 
major investing countries.  There is a potential source of spurious correlation here, in 
that any individual country effects may be caused by heterogeneity in the data or by 
individual industry level effects. In order to allow for this a full set of time dummies 
and industry dummies were included in the analysis. There is no evidence that the 
results reported here are sensitive to the inclusion of such dummies, which is 
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reassuring given that several countries (Japan, Sweden and Ireland for example) have 
their investment in the UK concentrated in a few industries.  
 Results for both time periods are summarised in Tables 5a and 5b respectively, which 
show the coefficient value and level of significance for the externality parameterxiii.  
The country specific-effects reveal that there are indeed substantial variations, both 
among countries and between the high and low R&D industries.  Although 
competition effects predominate overall in the foreign-owned sector (see Table 3), 
positive productivity externalities are evident from investment by affiliates originating 
from the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland for the period 1984-92. In addition, 
investment from Germany, Canada and the United States also generates significant 
positive effects, but only for R&D intensive industries. Only Japanese affiliates have a 
negative productivity effect overall on other foreign firms in the UK, while French 
firms generate a negative effect for high R&D industries.  In general, efficiency 
effects offset competition effects (i.e. the externality coefficient is positive) in the 
knowledge intensive (high R&D) industries, with negative or no spillover effects in 
the low R&D industries.  The exceptions to this general pattern are Sweden and 
Switzerland, which record significant positive effects in both high and low R&D 
industries.   
For the later time period (Table 5b) the pattern is broadly similar. The major 
difference relates to France, where the negative effect in high-R&D industries 
disappears, and the overall externality effect becomes weakly positive.  The negative 
effect for Japan is now restricted to the low R&D industries. 
Overall, foreign affiliates operating in knowledge-intensive industries in the UK 
derive positive productivity effects from contact with other foreign affiliates, except 
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those from France in the earlier time period.  In less R&D intensive industries, where 
the scope for knowledge-based intangible transfers is more limited, competition 
effects offset or outweigh productivity spillovers, with the effect particularly 
noticeable for affiliates originating from Japan.  Swedish and Swiss affiliates are a 
notable exception to this pattern, apparently generating significantly positive 
spillovers even in low R&D industries. 
The major investing country in the UK has long been the United States.  A further 
insight into the nature of competitive and productivity-enhancing effects within the 
foreign-owned sector can be gained by the estimation of (2) for a subset of industries, 
omitting the US-owned firms. The coefficients on Xit can then be interpreted as an 
estimate of whether investment by non-US firms in the UK generates spillovers to 
other non-US firms. Tables 6a and 6b present these estimated coefficients, and 
reproduce the coefficient estimates from Tables 5a and 5b for comparison. The results 
of a t-test of equality in the spillover elasticities is also shown, indicating whether the 
estimates of the spillover effects of FDI among the foreign-owned sector in the UK 
are significantly different when US firms are included in the analysis.  
The results indicate that the strong competition effects generated by R&D intensive 
French firms impact largely on American affiliates in the UK.  Indeed, in the absence 
of US firms the externality effect of French firms in the R&D intensive industries 
becomes strongly positive in both periods, in line with that of most countries.  By 
contrast, Japanese R&D intensive firms show precisely the reverse pattern.  When US 
firms are removed from the analysis the externality effects in both periods become 
sharply negative, indicating that European affiliates in the UK bear the brunt of 
Japanese knowledge-intensive competition.  However, Japanese low R&D 
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competition is aimed at both American and European affiliates (the externality is 
consistently negative), with some suggestion of increased Japanese competition with 
European rivals during the latter period.  This suggests that Japanese affiliates 
operating in industries which are not knowledge intensive have widened their ability 
to take market share from other (mainly European) MNE affiliates based in the UK. 
 
The comparison of with-US and without-US externality effects also sheds some light 
on which countries’ affiliates contribute most to the productivity of US firms 
operating in the UK.  Everyone in the foreign sector appears to benefit from the 
presence of Swedish and Swiss affiliates in the knowledge-intensive industries, but 
when US affiliates are removed from the analysis much stronger competition effects 
are evident in the low R&D industries, implying that American affiliates are the ones 
which principally benefit from productivity spillovers arising from Swedish and Swiss 
firms operating in the less knowledge-intensive industries in the UK. 
 
Our initial results suggested that foreign firms entering the UK generally gain from 
indigenous investment, but compete with other foreign firms.  We can now refine the 
latter part of that conclusion, not only in terms of different industries and the 
importance of R&D intensity, but also in terms of the country specific effects. The 
dominance of the competition effect is restricted largely (but not exclusively) to low 
R&D industries, with  ‘new’ foreign investment from  Japan taking significant market 
share from European affiliates in the UK.  This evidence of significant crowding out 
effects within the UK as a result of new FDI is consistent with results reported 
elsewhere (Buffie,1993; Driffield,1999).  In the knowledge intensive industries, 
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foreign affiliates generally exhibit productivity-enhancing effects from the affiliates 
of other investing nations, especially in the chemicals, electrical engineering and 
instrument engineering industries which account for the majority of the high R&D 
investment in the sample. The results of Tables 6a and 6b suggest that the greatest 
positive spillover effects seem to involve European firms appropriating spillovers 
from each other in industries where their productivity is very similar, or where US 
firms source technology from a very select group of (mainly Swedish and Swiss) 
firms in particular industries. Perhaps the most interesting result concerns the 
spillover effects generated by Canadian FDI. Canadian firms in R&D intensive 
sectors generate spillovers, but these effects are greater when the impact on US firms 
is included. It seems unlikely that US firms would source technology from Canadian 
firms by entering the UK, so the result is more suggestive of general agglomeration 
economies, with firms from North America and the more technology intensive 
countries of Europe locating in certain countries to access a general stock of 
knowledge, rather than targeting certain countries per se.  
 
 6.  Conclusions 
This paper has concentrated on the search for productivity and competition effects 
within the foreign-owned sector in UK manufacturing, and between the foreign and 
domestic sectors. Our results indicate that the foreign sector in UK manufacturing 
derives substantial productivity spillovers from UK-owned firms, but that this effect is 
restricted to relatively knowledge intensive industries. Productivity spillovers within 
the foreign-owned sector are also largely restricted to knowledge-intensive industries, 
but in aggregate are more than offset by market stealing effects. However, the nature 
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of the interaction between productivity and competition effects is complex, and there 
appears to be significant variation across countries of ownership, and across 
industries. The scope for technology sourcing between MNE affiliates in the UK is 
clearly significant, as is the scope for competition. Overall, the results suggest that the 
firms experiencing the competition effects most strongly are other European firms, 
largely at the hands of Japanese firms. This offers an interesting perspective on the 
tariff-jumping rationale for FDI, to the extent that Japanese and US firms entered the 
UK over this period in order to access the European single market. Those most likely 
to lose out as a result of this are the European (including the UK) firms. This result is 
illustrated by not only the individual country effects, but also the overall effects 
reported in Tables 2 and 3, given that the majority of FDI is from the US. 
One obvious interpretation of this research overall is that technology sourcing by 
foreign affiliates in the UK is not restricted to UK establishments, but also occurs 
within the foreign-owned sector. While this is doubtless true, our results are also 
consistent with a broader scenario, outlined earlier with respect to Canadian affiliates.  
This is an agglomeration effect, where a given (knowledge intensive) sector has a 
high degree of foreign ownership and large quantities of inward FDI.  Under such 
conditions, the opportunity for both rent and pure knowledge spillovers to develop 
might be very great, and regardless of whether inward FDI was consciously motivated 
by technology sourcing considerations, positive productivity externalities are likely to 
develop among foreign affiliates.  It is not difficult to imagine this being the case in 
the pharmaceuticals, chemicals and electronic industries in the UK, all of which have 
a major foreign presence.  Although these foreign affiliates may well compete with 
each other, the UK provides such a small part of their total market that any 
competition effect within Britain is more than swamped by the efficiency-enhancing 
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effects of being in relatively close proximity to other highly research-active 
enterprises. By contrast, the strong market-stealing effect exhibited by Japanese 
producers mainly in less knowledge-intensive industries is a feature of production 
plants producing mainly for the domestic market, which is the case for many of the 
Japanese white goods producers located in Wales, and to some extent also true of 
Japanese-owned car plants in the UK. 
 
Our results may also have policy implications. National and regional governments 
have a long history of offering financial and other inducements to multinational 
enterprises in order to encourage the establishment of local production facilities.  
While this is done partly in order to benefit from expected direct and indirect 
employment increases, there is a recognition among many agencies that the benefits 
of FDI may go far beyond those of employment.  From a welfare perspective, 
encouraging inward investment may be justified if the social returns to FDI exceed 
the private returns.  In practice, such an effect is usually regarded as being most likely 
in terms of local firms deriving some productivity spillovers from gaining access to 
the firm-specific knowledge that accompanies inward FDI.  While such spillover 
effects may arise, our results indicate that this is not a one-way process: foreign 
affiliates clearly benefit from the technology of indigenous UK firms, as well as that 
of other foreign affiliates.  This suggests that, in order to see the full costs and benefits 
of inward FDI, policy-makers might benefit from research which further explores the 
links between the motivation for FDI and its productivity and competition effects, not 
just between the domestic and foreign sectors, but also within the foreign-owned 
sector. 
 22
Table 1: Foreign investment by country of ownership over the period. 
 
 
 
* Investment from 
Liechtenstein was excluded 
from the empirical analysis on 
the grounds that MNEs of 
many nationalities use 
Liechstenstein registration as a 
flag of convenience. 
Country 
 
Number of 
industries 
(max=31) 
Total investment
1984-1997 
£ million 
Australia 4 626794.35
Belgium 1 24212.31
Canada 10 1667601.67
Denmark 3 236713.81
Finland 2 545932.07
France  14 2472018.66
Germany  15 3934459.92
Hong Kong 1 0.00
Israel 1 8604.24
Italy 1 96974.52
Japan 8 3990882.50
Liechtenstein* 12 142942.28
Luxembourg 1 43413.26
Malaysia 1 1688.94
Netherlands  11 1289473.39
Norway 2 266918.05
Republic of Ireland  10 438327.67
South Africa 1 12014.06
Sweden 8 847707.35
Switzerland  12 2401912.45
Taiwan 1 10183.00
United Kingdom  29 167569474.74
United States  26 28755106.52
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Table 2.  Estimation of equation 2: all nationalities 
 
 
1984-1992 1993-1997 
Parameter Estimate t-stat P-value Parameter Estimate t-stat P-value 
Qit-1 0.003 0.24 [.810] Qit-1 0.477 3.43** [.001] 
MLit 0.411 3.70** [.000] Lit 0.652 4.76** [.000] 
NLit 0.408 3.24** [.000]     
Kit 0.079 3.78* [.000] Kit 0.154 2.40** [.017] 
Xit-1 0.104 3.38** [.000] Xit-1 0.116 3.60** [.000] 
time 0.067 3.23** [.000] time 0.131 1.76* [.079] 
Specification 2(5)  Specification 2(4)  
Sargan - p value  Sargan - p value  
serial correlation  
AR(2) ~ 2(1) 
 serial correlation  
AR(2) ~ 2(1) 
 
N (9 years) 1538 N (5 years) 835 
 
 
 
Table 3.  Estimation of equation 2:  Foreign sector only 
 
 
1984-1992 1993-1997 
Parameter Estimate t-stat P-value Parameter Estimate t-stat P-value 
Qit-1 0.032 1.06 [.290] Qit-1 0.060 1.44 [.152] 
MLit 0.407 3.67** [.000] Lit 0.684 8.14** [.000] 
NLit 0.527 3.13** [.000]     
Kit 0.111 3.60** [.029] Kit 0.276 6.69** [.000] 
UKIit-1 0.069 2.33** [.001] UKIit-1 0.031 3.68** [.000] 
FDIit-1 -0.132 -4.94** [.000] FDIit-1 -0.068 -6.69** [.000] 
time 0.061 3.12** [.002] time 0.074 2.00** [.046] 
Specification 2(3)  Specification 2(3)  
Sargan - p value  Sargan - p value  
serial correlation  
AR(2) ~ 2(1) 
 serial correlation  
AR(2) ~ 2(1) 
 
N (9 years) 1415 N (5 years) 798 
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Table 4.  Estimation of equation 2:  Foreign sector only (low and high R&D 
intensity) 
 
Low R&D industries 
 
1984-1992 1993-1997 
Parameter Estimate t-stat P-value Parameter Estimate t-stat P-value 
Qit-1 0.005 2.52 [.012] Qit-1 0.005 2.89** [.004] 
MLit 0.516 7.42** [.000] Lit 0.585 6.59** [.000] 
NLit 0.721 9.77** [.000]     
Kit 0.131 7.48** [.009] Kit 0.133 3.87** [.000] 
UKI it-1 0.060 1.10 [.272] UKI it-1 0.033 1.65 [.100] 
FDIit-1 -0.063 -11.00** [.000] FDIit-1 -0.035 -1.59 [.113] 
time 0.029 3.31** [.001] Time 0.025 3.09** [.002] 
Specification 2(5)  Specification 2(4)  
Sargan – p value  Sargan - p value  
serial correlation  
AR(2) ~ 2(1) 
 serial correlation  
AR(2) ~ 2(1) 
 
N (9 years) 952 N (5 years) 391 
 
 
 
High R&D industries: 
 
1984-1992 1993-1997 
Parameter Estimate t-stat P-value Parameter Estimate t-stat P-value 
Qit-1 0.011 5.62* [.000] Qit-1 0.014 1.48 [.142] 
MLit 0.334 3.14** [.000] Lit 0.811 15.90** [.000] 
NLit 0.499 7.56** [.000]     
Kit 0.339 9.35** [.000] Kit 0.244 6.27** [.000] 
UKI it-1 0.045 7.56** [.000] UKI it-1 0.100 5.05** [.000] 
FDIit-1 -0.045 -6.68** [.000] FDIit-1 -0.117 -3.18** [.002] 
Time 0.020 0.28 [.773] Time 0.080 0.38 [.709] 
Specification 2(5)  Specification 2(4)  
Sargan - p value  Sargan - p value  
serial correlation  
AR(2) ~ 2(1) 
 serial correlation  
AR(2) ~ 2(1) 
 
N (9 years) 463 N (5 years) 407 
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Table 5a.  Estimates of FDIit-1: Country-specific effects 1984-92 
 
Country Full sample High R&D Industries Low R&D Industries 
USA 0.011 (1.89) 
i=16 
0.0014 (3.82) 
i= 9 
-0.0013 (-1.20) 
i=7 
France 0.0016 (0.63) 
i=13 
-0.0096 (-3.85) 
i=6 
0.0018 (1.33) 
i=7 
Germany 0.002 (1.18) 
i=13 
0.0089 (6.75) 
i=6 
0.001 (0.57) 
i=7 
Japan -0.002 (-2.31) 
i=8 
0.002 (1.54) 
i=6 
-0.004 (-2.02) 
i=2 
Netherlands 0.130 (3.04) 
i=11 
0.142 (2.56)  
i=6 
0.025 (1.33) 
i=5 
Sweden 0.027 (2.80) 
i=7 
0.024 (2.62)  
i=2 
0.0038 (2.90) 
i=5 
Switzerland 0.0018 (3.76) 
i=10 
0.002 (2.04)  
i=4 
0.029 (2.21) 
i=6 
Republic of Ireland 0.0006 (0.67) 
i= 10 
0.0065 (1.07) 
(i=4) 
-0.00072 (-1.13) 
i=6 
Canada 0.013 (1.22) 
i=8 
0.007 (2.98) 
i=5 
-0.001 (-1.12) 
i=3 
 
t- statistics in brackets.  
i refers to the number of industries with an ownership presence from that country for at least 4 
consecutive years. 
 
Table 5b.   Estimates of FDIit-1: Country-specific effects 1993-1997. 
 
Country Full sample High R&D Industries Low R&D Industries 
USA 0.029 (1.22) 
i=20 
0.057 (2.73) 
i=9 
0.058 (1.38) 
i=11 
France 0.094 (1.71) 
i=8 
0.039 (1.86) 
i=5 
0.035 (1.23) 
i=3 
Germany 0.062 (1.90) 
i=8 
0.060 (2.30) 
i=5 
0.020 (0.72) 
i=3 
Japan 0.006 (0.34) 
i=3 
0.084 (1.88) 
i=2 
-0.060 (-3.15) 
i=1 
Netherlands 0.026 (0.784) 
i=8 
0.060 (2.15) 
i=3 
0.002 (0.23) 
i=5 
Sweden 0.136 (6.29) 
i=3 
0.109 (3.73)  
i=2 
0.030 (1.77) 
i=1 
Switzerland 0.059 (2.43) 
i=7 
0.093 (4.12)  
i=4 
0.060 (1.90) 
i=3 
Republic of Ireland 0.0086 (1.18) 
i=7 
0.015 (1.22) 
i=2 
-0.017 (-0.81) 
i=5 
Canada 0.040 (1.35) 
i=8 
0.087 (2.05) 
i=5 
-0.032 (1.05) 
i=3 
 
t-statistics in brackets. 
i refers to the number of industries with an ownership presence from that country for at least 4 
consecutive years. 
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Table 6a: Estimates of FDIit-1: Country-specific effects 1984-92 (excluding US)  
 
 
Country Full sample High R&D Industries Low R&D 
Industries 
France 0.0016 (0.63)  
-0.0003  (-0.42) 
-0.0096 (-3.85) 
0.0077  (3.99)*** 
0.0018 (1.33) 
-0.0007  (-1.60)* 
Germany 0.002 (1.18) 
0.0017  (1.69) 
0.0089 (6.75) 
0.0076  (2.26) 
0.001 (0.57) 
0.001  (2.04) 
Japan -0.002 (-2.31) 
-0.0171  (-1.91)* 
0.002 (1.54) 
-0.0027  (-2.73)*** 
-0.004 (-2.02) 
-0.0011  (-0.72) 
Netherlands 0.130 (3.04) 
0.0602 (4.03) 
0.142 (2.56) 
0.0813  (4.25) 
0.025 (1.33) 
0.0028  (2.39) 
Sweden 0.027 (2.80) 
0.0043  (4.09)** 
0.024 (2.62) 
0.0020  (2.28)** 
0.0038 (2.90) 
0.0012  (1.56) 
Switzerland 0.0018 (3.76) 
0.0015  (1.73) 
0.002 (2.04) 
0.0072  (2.53)* 
0.029 (2.21) 
0.0068  (1.17) 
Republic of Ireland 0.0006 (0.67) 
0.00009 (1.26) 
0.0065 (1.07) 
0.0097  (2.22) 
-0.00072 (-1.13) 
-0.0014 (-2.19) 
Canada 0.013 (1.22) 
0.0004 (0.37) 
0.007 (2.98) 
0.0014 (2.46)*** 
-0.001 (-1.12) 
-0.0012 (-1.13) 
 
t- statistics in brackets refer to the estimated coefficients.   
 
Asterisks refer to a t-test of equality of mean estimated spillover elasticities (with and without 
US). Significant at *10%, **5%, ***1% on a two-tailed test. 
 
 
Table 6b. Estimates of FDIit-1: Country-specific effects 1993-1997 (excluding US)  
 
Country Full sample High R&D Industries Low R&D 
Industries 
France 0.094 (1.71) 
0.035  (2.14)* 
0.039 (1.86) 
0.052   (2.61) 
0.035 (1.23) 
0.017  (0.57) 
Germany 0.062 (1.90) 
0.045  (2.22)* 
0.060 (2.30) 
0.075   (2.74)** 
0.020 (0.72) 
0.010  (0.37) 
Japan 0.006 (0.34) 
-0.009  (-0.58) 
0.084 (1.88) 
-0.107   (-2.66)** 
-0.060 (-3.15) 
-0.021  (-3.11)*** 
Netherlands 0.026 (0.78) 
0.017  (3.60) 
0.060 (2.15) 
0.015   (1.33) 
0.002 (0.23) 
0.045  (1.53) 
Sweden 0.136 (6.29) 
0.014  (0.56)*** 
0.109 (3.73) 
0.181  (3.31)*** 
0.030 (1.77) 
-0.055  (-2.86)* 
Switzerland 0.059 (2.43) 
0.095  (4.93)** 
0.093 (4.12) 
0.016  (2.84)*** 
0.060 (1.90) 
-0.100  (-4.84) 
Republic of Ireland 0.0086 (1.18) 
0.022 (0.97) 
0.015 (1.12) 
0.047 (1.37) 
-0.017 (-0.81) 
0.027 (1.47) 
Canada 0.040 (1.35) 
0.021 (1.27) 
0.087 (2.05) 
0.053 (2.15) 
-0.032 (-1.05) 
-0.034 (-1.08) 
 
t- statistics in brackets refer to the estimated coefficients.   
 
Asterisks refer to a t-test of equality of mean estimated spillover elasticities (with and without 
US). Significant at *10%, **5%, ***1% on a two-tailed test. 
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i See Blomström and Kokko (1998) for a review of the evidence. However, Görg and Strobl (2001) 
demonstrate that this may be sensitive to the measure of foreign involvement. 
ii However, Love (2003) finds little evidence of technology sourcing among inward or outward US FDI 
over the period 1981-95. 
iii Clearly competition may have a positive effect on domestic productivity in the long run, either by 
encouraging local firms to become more efficient or by forcing the least efficient out of business. 
iv Technology sourcing with market stealing is an unlikely combination in reality, because the 
technological laggard is in a poor position to compete with local or other foreign firms.  For this reason 
Sembenelli and Siotis (2002) conclude that technology sourcing is likely to leave competitive 
conditions unchanged. They also point out that competition and spillover effects might not only go in 
opposite directions but have different dynamics, the former rapid and short-run and the latter occurring 
more slowly and lasting longer. 
v This is the standard ‘fixed effects’ model, which is well understood, and is explained for example in 
Baltagi (1995). This allows for an industry specific component, and a time specific component. The 
econometric treatment of this is discussed in the text. 
vi This argument is the basis for the importance of inward capital investment (rather than employment 
or output) on a host economy, see for example Dunning (1958), Hood and Young (1979).  Blomström 
(1986) stresses that it is ownership of assets that counts in FDI, not employment, while Hejazi and 
Safarian (1999) point out that employment or output measures may understate the level of FDI, because 
of the greater capital intensity of MNEs compared to indigenous enterprises. 
vii See Oulton (1996) for a full discussion of this. Empirically this can be tested for using standard 
heteroskedasticity or specification tests. 
viii We formally test for this by substituting contemporaneous domestic output for lagged capital growth 
in estimating equation 2. This specification is rejected in all the results presented below, using standard 
specification tests. 
ix These data are similar therefore to the type of information that is provided in the UK Annual 
Business Inquiry, formerly the Report on the Census Of Production, published annually by the UK 
Office for National Statistics.  
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x For an in-depth description of the geographical and industrial distribution of FDI into the UK see Pain 
(2001). 
xi Weights based both on industry size and the relative importance of country of ownership were 
employed, but to little effect.  
xii Clearly this is a net effect.  It is conceivable that foreign firms do appropriate spillovers from each 
other as much as they do from UK firms, but that they compete only (or largely) with each other in 
such a way that the net externality effect is negative.  This is investigated further below.  
xiii Details of the full estimation of equation 2 for each country are available from the authors. 
